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In making the (false) assumption of the reconciliation of the individual or community 
with the reason of the law, the [South African] Constitution arrives at the metaphor of 
Western metaphysics, logos reconciled with nomos …. In the metaphor of 
logonomocentrism, ‘the claim of the unity of self and others in absolute reason of the 
law’ is made.  Logonomocentrism promises the truth of reason and the reason of law, 
which are both games of figurality and rhetoricity.  If, however, there is asymmetry 
between the practices of religious persons and the reasons of the state (nomos), then 
the only way logonomocentrism deals with these relations is to ‘other’ and 
delegitimize these practices as aberrant and illegal.1 
 
Introduction 
Each of the chapters in this volume address different aspects of the same basic puzzle: what is the 
relationship between “religious establishment” and the closely related category of “religious 
freedom”?  Conventional wisdom has it that the former is a contingent political issue addressed 
to the relationship between religion(s) and the State, while the latter is a universal moral issue 
addressed to the relationship between individual rights-bearers and the State. As understood in 
Anglo-American legal history, establishment or non-establishment are merely the particular 
forms of institutional relation that developed between England and the newly-separated English 
church in the mid-sixteenth century and between the newly-independent United States and a 
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variety of religious arrangements, including state establishments, in the former colonies in the 
late eighteenth century.  We can thus speak today of an “established church” or “official or 
dominant religion” as an enduring feature of modern national constitutions.  But beyond the 
culturally and historically limited category of “establishment,” we can also see today a 
tremendous variety of constitutional arrangements in the world prescribing different forms of 
relation between the State and religion(s).2  This includes a variety of forms of recognition of and 
formal relation to both majority and minority religions.3 
The distinction between religion-state relations, on the one hand, and the right to religious 
freedom, on the other, allows us to see that there is no intrinsic or necessary correlation between 
the degree of “establishment” and the protection accorded to religious liberty.  The United 
Kingdom, for example, has an established church, but at the same time accords robust legal 
protection to the individual right of religious freedom, while China has an avowedly secular 
public sphere but comparatively weak legal protection of the right.4   
There are, however, at least two apparently intrinsic connections between the categories 
of establishment and right/freedom.  The first is that these categories rest on an underlying 
assumption of secularism or “the secular.”  Whether and to what extent a religion is 
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“established,” and where and how to demarcate the lines between religion and politics, are 
ultimately questions for the state to decide.  This is the defining feature, indeed essential paradox, 
of modern secularism.5  The second is that, while there may be no necessary correlation between 
establishment and the right to religious freedom, where the right is recognized by the State, its 
meaning and scope will be dynamically interrelated with the nature of the public sphere in a 
particular society.   This last point is a source of great confusion today. Contemporary religious 
freedom discourse is shaped by two interrelated features: first, a conception of political authority 
not in terms of any formal relation between the state and religion(s), but in terms of secular 
neutrality, and second, a conception of the right in terms of freedom.  The discourse is able to 
maintain its simultaneous, and ultimately paradoxical, claims to uniqueness (because neutral 
towards religion) and universality (because securing the right to freedom of religion) by defining 
each concept in terms of the other. The constantly oscillating dialectic between neutrality and 
freedom ensures that the nature of the public sphere is dynamically related to the scope of the 
right to religious freedom.6 
What this conceptual structure means is that the political nature of the public sphere (i.e. 
the relation of actually existing religions and religious communities to the state) is in practice 
understood and configured in terms of a moral theory of individual rights (i.e. the relation of 
rights-bearers as legal subjects to the State).  Conversely, the actual meaning accorded to the 
right to religious liberty in any particular case or controversy is in practice understood and 
configured in terms of the political nature of the public sphere. In this way, what was first a 
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political question becomes a moral question, and what was first a moral question becomes 
transformed into a political question.  Both nomos (the public sphere) and logos (the right) are 
ineliminably contextual and interconnected.  Any account of nomian neutrality will quickly 
devolve into hypostasis or reification of an historically specific political order and thus a 
particular definition of “religion and belief” and specific form of demarcation between “public 
and private” spheres.  Any account of the right, when viewed historically, will reveal that rival 
intellectual traditions and normative dissonances and conflicts are internal to the right itself. The 
right, in other words, is simultaneously historically relative and normatively plural. 
The thesis of this chapter is that the category of “religious establishment” has been 
gradually transformed in modern liberal secular discourse into the category of moral right—the 
right to religious liberty.  What today is viewed as “established” is not actually existing, 
politically negotiated relations between the State and particular religious communities or 
institutions (e.g. “the church,”), but rather the legal category of “right.”  Legal and religious 
obligations are re-described as rights of the subject in order to protect a normative conception of 
freedom.  As legal subjects religious individuals and groups thus assert claims of right which the 
state must then decide through legislation or adjudication to recognize or restrict. This makes 
contestation over rights claims an increasingly political process and further increases the power 
of the state.   
Two key issues remain: first, who is the proper subject of the right? Are only individual 
persons, or may religious groups, communities, and institutions also properly be regarded as 
entitled to claim the right to religious freedom?  Second, what is the scope and meaning of the 
right?  Does it encompass merely a right to non-interference in the so-called “private sphere” 
(and, if so, non-interference into what exactly?), or does it extend to various forms of public 
recognition and accommodation by the State (and, if so, to which claims and religious practices 
exactly and with what legal effect)?  
This chapter explores the normative dissonances and antinomies generated by the politics 
around religious establishment by examining post-apartheid law reform efforts in South Africa to 
recognize Muslim marriages.  Since the late 1990s, the South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC) has initiated various projects to recognize the claims of and redress past discrimination 
against different religious communities, including tribal groups living under customary law and 
religious minorities with their own family and personal status laws.  It is striking how the norms 
and assumptions underpinning this debate differ from engagements involving the claims of 
religious communities in Europe and North America today where broadly Protestant genealogies 
of the right to freedom of conscience have become naturalized. The value-pluralist nature of the 
post-apartheid constitutional order is transforming the politics between religious communities 
and opening new spaces for legal and social reform.  We are thus seeing new and intense debates 
on questions of legal pluralism and the tensions between individual and group rights and 
identities. This dynamic provides important insights into the meaning and scope of religious 
freedom as a human right.  
  After a brief overview of the history of Muslim communities in South Africa and the 
reasons for the non-recognition of Muslim marriages, I describe the efforts undertaken by the 
SALRC to prepare a draft bill recognizing Muslim marriages as a matter of state law and the 
politics which has subsequently emerged around competing claims to and understandings of 
recognition of Muslim personal law (MPL), and I offer reflections on the reasons for and 
implications of these antinomies and divergences.  The law reform efforts in South Africa have 
exposed critical ambivalences and normative resistance to the two great transformations which 
together define the modern politics of religious freedom: the first relating to the emergence of a 
“secular” public realm imagined to be independent of and in some new relation to “religion,” 
now viewed as solely a matter for private life (the so-called public/private divide), and the second 
relating to the redefinition of religion itself as conscience or belief in an age of what we might 
term secular equality where the unstable convergence between conscience and autonomy has 
gradually reversed in the secular imaginary such that religious liberty is today viewed as 
autonomy.    
 
History of Muslim Communities in South Africa 
There have been Muslim communities in southern Africa for more than 300 years.7  The 
heterogeneity of these groups is a product of the history of settlement and colonialism in southern 
Africa from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century.  Malay Muslims first came to the 
Cape as servants of the Dutch as early as 1658.  Southeast Asian Muslims came as political 
prisoners, convicts, and slaves starting in 1667, and Indian Muslims began arriving in the mid-
1850s, first as indentured laborers imported to work on British sugar plantations in Natal and 
later voluntarily.8  Today, these communities are the largest religious minority in the country, 
comprising approximately 1.5 percent of the total population.9  
State recognition of Islamic law and the organization of Muslim legal affairs generally 
was limited during this the first couple of centuries, and the extent to which Muslims in the Cape 
resorted to the official (secular) courts in matters of family law and succession is unclear.10  What 
is known is that, following the founding of the first mosque in the Cape around 1805, imams 
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began to assert authority over family law matters and by the early nineteenth century “some form 
of community judicial structures were in place which dealt with religious matters of a legal 
nature.”11 
In the early twentieth century, the practice of Muslim personal law over matters of 
marriage, divorce, custody, and succession began to be administered judicially and socially by 
Ulama Councils (Muslim clergy).12  By 1935 the Jamiatul Ulama of Transvaal was established, 
the Muslim Judicial Council followed in 1945, and the Jamiatul Ulama of Natal was founded in 
1955.  Subsequently other ulama bodies emerged including the Majlis Ashura al-Islami in 1969, 
the Islamic Council of South Africa in 1975, the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama of South Africa in 1978, 
the Majlisul Ulama in 1976, and the Sunni Ulama Council in 1994.13 The state, however, 
consistently refused to recognize Muslim personal law, and thus Muslim marriages contracted 
according to Islamic law were not recognized, causing hardship and injustice to Muslim 
communities, especially women and children. 
 The doctrinal rational for non-recognition was stated as early as 1860 when the Cape 
Supreme Court refused to recognize an applicant as a legitimate child on the grounds that a 
Muslim marriage was “recognized concubinage” because potentially polygynous and thus 
contrary to public policy.14  This rationale remained in effect in South African law to the present 
day.  As recently as 1983, the Appellate Division reaffirmed that an Islamic marriage was contra 
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bona mores, i.e. “contrary to the accepted customs and usages which are regarded as morally 
binding upon all members of our society.”15   
This close nexus between monogamy and “civilized” marriage can be traced to the 
complex entanglement of Christian norms and doctrine within South African law and culture.  In 
the 1860 Bronn case, for example, the Cape Supreme Court stated that  
. . . marriage is a condition Divine in its institution … and it is only by the 
development of Christianity that the sacred and mysterious union has been clearly 
revealed to mankind, and has enjoined a strict observance of its requirements, and one 
of the first of these requirements is, amongst all Christian nations, that polygamy is 
unlawful, and that marriage is only good when contracted with a man who is not 
already married to another woman.16  
This statement offers a classical legal conception of marriage as status—universal and 
fundamental to civilization and to law.17  As Janet Halley has observed, marriage as status is still 
today understood as “an institution, public not private, controlled by the will of the state, not that 
of the parties.”18   
 The effect of this law was essentially threefold: first, South African Muslims as a 
community were discriminated against on the basis of their religion and treated as second-class 
citizens; second, Muslim personal law evolved and was applied by ulama bodies in isolation 
from both the obligations and rights accorded by state law; and third, unjust consequences 
resulted for Muslims who were denied legislative rights and benefits available to marriages 
recognized by civil law.  A Muslim wife therefore could be unable to enforce her right to mahr 
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(dower) due to strict interpretations of shari’a by the ulama in her community, while at the same 
time being unable to enforce a claim for maintenance under civil law due to non-recognition of 
her Muslim marriage. 
While some of the more deleterious effects of these judgments have begun to be 
ameliorated by courts in the post-apartheid era,19 and while judges have begun to recognize 
certain aspects of Muslim personal law in the form of civil contracts,20 Muslim marriages remain 
unrecognized and thus potentially illegal as a matter of South African law.  It was this 
unsatisfactory situation that led to the establishment of a Project Committee of the SALRC in 
1999, which started an investigation into Islamic Marriages and Related Matters.21  
 
Legal Recognition of Muslim Marriages 
Section 15 and the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief 
Section 15 of the 1996 Bill of Rights introduced the following provision into South African 
constitutional law: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion. 
This section does not prevent legislation recognising  
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or 
family law; or 
(ii)  systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons 
professing a particular religion.22 
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The distinctive normative structure of Section 15 is instructive.  The subject of the right is said to 
be “everyone” (presumably every “person”) while the scope of the right is said to extend to 
“freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”  It is not clear on its face whether 
this includes marriages concluded under systems of personal or religious law or the systems of 
personal or family law “adhered to by persons professing a particular religion” themselves.  
Section 15(3) simply states that “[t]his section does not prevent legislation recognising” such 
marriages or systems of personal or family law, with the proviso set out in Section 15(3)(b) that 
any such legislative recognition “must be consistent with this section [i.e. the right in Section 
15(1)] and the other provisions of the Constitution.”  
 How should we interpret these provisions?  Clearly Section 15(3) both anticipates and 
authorizes forms of legal relation between the State and South Africa’s different religious 
communities, including groups living under customary law and religious minorities with their 
own family and personal status laws.  Indeed, Section 15 expressly states that the right to 
religious freedom itself as embedded in the new Bill of Rights cannot be read to prevent the legal 
recognition of such religious practices and institutions (e.g. Muslim marriages) or systems of law 
(e.g. Muslim personal status law).  In contrast to the Establishment Clause in the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution providing that “Congress shall make no law respecting the 
establishment of religion,” Section 15 says that the national government may not prevent laws 
establishing forms of recognition of religion and religious doctrine and practice.   
 Given that the title of Section 15 is Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion, it is clear 
that the prohibition in Section 15(3) expresses an important aspect of this freedom. The category 
of religious establishment is employed here to define and protect a particular normative 
                                                                                                                                                        
right, with other members of that community (a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language.” 
Section 235 further provides that the “right of South African people as a whole to self-determination … does not preclude … 
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heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.” 
conception of freedom while the category of right is identified as a potential limitation on that 
conception.  Courts and legislatures are instructed by the Bill of Rights to read Sections 15(1) and 
15(3) together, i.e. as entrenching a conception of the right that both allows space for and 
accommodates diverse forms of both collective religious practice and identity as well as non-state 
systems of personal or religious law.  Any resulting recognition or accommodation, however, 
cannot be inconsistent with the right to religious freedom itself in Section 15(1) or any other 
fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to equality in Section 9.  
The political questions of non-interference in or recognition by the State of religious 
norms and practices are ultimately held to be subject to the normative (moral) constraints of the 
right.  At the same time, the subject and scope of the right are each ambiguous, allowing space 
for forms of (political) contestation and recognition of religious norms, identities, and practices.  
The question then becomes how these obvious antinomies and contradictions on issues of legal 
establishment, freedom and pluralism, and individual and group rights and identities are to be 
navigated and, if only provisionally, resolved.  
 
The Recognition of Muslim Marriages Bill 
In July 2003 the SALRC released its report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters, including 
a draft of the Muslim Marriages Bill.  The basic structure and purpose of the Bill was to make 
provision for the recognition of existing Muslim marriages (whether monogamous or 
polygynous) as well as existing civil marriages to a second wife.23  The Bill specifies the 
requirements of a valid Muslim marriage and provides for registration of such marriages.24  It 
further specifies that the proprietary consequences of Muslim marriages will be automatically out 
of community of property, unless the parties agree otherwise by registered antenuptial 
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agreement.25  In relation to termination of Muslim marriages, the Bill specifies that this can be by 
faskh (dissolution by a court on the application of the wife), talaq (right of the husband to 
terminate), or khula (dissolution at the instance of the wife), but the consequences of such 
termination have to be confirmed by a court.26 The Bill also contains further provisions dealing 
with custody and maintenance.27  It is interesting to note that the Bill does not provide for 
independent shari’a courts, but rather seeks to implement Muslim Personal Law in the existing 
court system with the requirement that a Muslim judge or advocate and two Muslim assessors be 
appointed to assist the court.28  Court decisions are then subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal with the proviso that decisions are submitted to two accredited Muslim institutions for 
written comment on questions of law only.29 
Waheeda Amien has described the two main benefits of the Bill as allowing Muslim 
parties to enjoy similar civil benefits as afforded to legal spouses while also allowing women to 
enjoy the positive benefits of a Muslim marriage.  This includes the provisions which (1) oblige 
parties to provide for mahr; (2) recognize the husband’s unilateral obligation to maintain his 
children and wife during the marriage and iddah; (3) oblige the husband in cases of divorce to 
provide a separate residence for the wife when she has custody of the children; (4) entitle the 
wife to be separately remunerated for breast-feeding purposes for two years from the birth of the 
child; (5) enable the court to make an equitable division of assets where a party has assisted in the 
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family business or contributed to the estate; (6) enable a surviving spouse to lodge a claim against 
her deceased husband’s estate for unpaid mahr and any contribution recognized by shari’a that 
she makes to his estate; (7) provide a minimum marriageable age of 18 years applicable to both 
parties; (8) recognize different forms of divorce available to women such as faskh, khula, and 
talaq, rather than simply talaq as the exclusive domain of the husband; and (9) recognize 
polygyny, but only in a limited form regulated to protect the interests of women.30 
The negative aspects of the Bill from Amien’s perspective include (1) the traditional 
Muslim approach to matrimonial property in the form of an out of community of property regime 
(although with an opt-out provision); (2) the fact that husband and wife are equal in human 
dignity, status, and capacity, but are not equal in rights (e.g. the husband only is allowed to take 
multiple wives and the wife is under a unilateral obligation to observe iddah); (3) the exclusive 
right of men to unilaterally repudiate the marriage (talaq); and (4) the placing of interpretation 
and implementation of these provisions in the hands of Muslim judges and assessors required to 
have “specialized knowledge of Islamic law” which makes the Bill susceptible to conservative 
interpretations of shari’a.31  
In order to see what is at stake in these competing positions, let us turn to consider the 
politics surrounding these issues which has evolved during the law reform process.   
 
The Politics of Religious Establishment 
As early as 1975, efforts were made to begin recognizing certain aspects of the legal 
consequences of Muslim marriages in South African law.  The main supporters of these early 
initiatives were the established ulama groups.  Others opposed these efforts as they suspected 
they “had more to do with the attempt to purchase legitimacy for the disgraced tricameral 
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parliament following the resistance that many Muslim groups offered the National Party 
government.”32  As Moosa acutely observes, Muslim responses to the overtures made by the 
apartheid state reverberated in “several registers of discourse” at the same time, and in them “one 
can discern the texture of colonial and racial discourses which run concurrently with the variety 
of Muslim discourses.”  These multiple discourses were “fractured and incomplete” and enfolded 
within themselves “conflicting and subterranean discourses,” with the result that “discrimination, 
resistance, religion and culture to mention a few issues, appear as moving categories whose 
political saliences shift in relation to one another.”33  In the turbulent politics of the 1980s, the 
strongest resistance to SALC reform initiatives came from Muslim youth activists and students 
who “suspected that the state with its array of intelligence and security networks in collaboration 
with quietest and reactionary Muslim elements were planning to neutralize the Muslim 
community with MPL.”34 
In response to the post-apartheid law reform proposals, it is possible to identify four 
distinct yet deeply entangled normative positions staked out by the various groups (both Muslim 
and non-Muslim) supporting or opposing legal recognition of Muslim marriages.  Let us consider 
each of these before turning to address the justifications and practical implications of each 
position. 
 
Four Perspectives and Reactions to the Bill  
Support for the Bill has come from two camps.  First are human rights organizations and 
activists, including “secular” Muslim groups and politically liberal organizations as well as the 
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34. Ibid., 138.  Consistent with policies regularly employed by the apartheid state, “[s]tate propagandists continuously 
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SALRC which together support legal recognition as a means to remedy the history of injustice, 
prejudice, and discrimination in South Africa against Muslims.  The Bill, it is argued, would 
bring South African law more in line with the values of freedom, equality, and pluralism 
enshrined in the new constitutional order and, despite inevitable and legitimate challenges on 
grounds of gender equality, will provide more protection for the rights of Muslim women than 
the status quo.  In line with contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, this is a position grounded 
in notions, not of formal, but substantive equality.   
The second camp are so-called “progressive” ulama and other Muslim civil society 
organizations, which recognize the social and political reality of Muslims as a religious minority 
in the new constitutional order, and see the Bill as a reasonable way to protect Islamic values and 
norms by incorporating Muslim personal law into South African law and seeking a balance and 
compromise with constitutional rights and imperatives.  Despite opening Muslim personal law to 
state regulation, these groups argue that legal recognition will paradoxically provide Muslims 
input and a degree of influence over any state interference while simultaneously elevating 
Muslim personal law to a more equal status in the public sphere, thus remedying both 
symbolically and substantively the historical mistreatment of Muslims as second-class citizens. 
Opposition to the Bill has also fallen into two broad camps.  First are the more stridently 
secularist and comprehensively “liberal” groups, who oppose the Bill as excessively entangling 
the State with questions of Islamic law and unconstitutionally enacting regressive and 
discriminatory Islamic norms and practices into state law.  Prominent women’s rights activists 
have thus argued that the drafting process was “manipulated to appease the Muslim clergy” and 
that, if enacted, the Constitutional Court will need to decide “how to deal with the conflict 
between the right to freedom of religion and women’s rights to equality.”35 Excessive 
entanglement, however, also includes concerns about religious freedom.  For constitutional 
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lawyers such Ziyad Motala, the draft Bill is thus “an unwise, improvident and questionable 
constitutional exercise.”36 Religion is a matter of voluntary choice, and the State should not 
transgress into the sphere of private belief or interfere with the autonomy of religious institutions.  
Conversely, the State should not endorse or become entangled in matters of religion, and the right 
to religious liberty should be understood as protecting inner conscience, belief, or opinion, not 
religious conduct falling into the sphere of legitimate legal jurisdiction.  This kind of negotiated 
and contingent modus vivendi is dangerous for both the State and religion—which should be kept 
separate. 
Paradoxically many of these concerns mirror those voiced by the second major opposition 
camp comprised of the more traditional ulama bodies and “conservative” Islamic organizations.  
These groups have opposed state regulation of Muslim personal law by a non-Islamic state and 
have argued for maintenance of the status quo where ulama institutions and officials both 
interpret and administer Muslim personal law within their communities.  Indeed, the notion of 
legal recognition has been argued to be against shari’a as it risks state interference with basic 
tenets of Islamic law precisely on the basis of the new constitutional values of freedom, equality, 
and pluralism.  For this reason some of these groups have advocated for full exemption of 
“Muslim family law legislation from the human rights provisions of the new constitution, arguing 
that these values conflicted with their version of Islamic law.”37   
It is striking to observe how the main fault-lines of disagreement correspond to the two 
issues discussed at the beginning of this chapter, religious establishment in the public sphere 
(nomos) and the right to religious freedom (logos), and the paradoxical ways in which each 
category is contested and defined in terms of the other.  Thus both camps opposing the Bill can 
be seen to be resisting the interrelation of this dialectic.  The traditional ulama bodies seek robust 
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37. Moosa, “Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa,” 139.  
recognition from the State as collective legal subjects with a broad right to non-interference 
(liberty). Their co-oppositionists oppose the Bill paradoxically for exactly the opposite reason: 
they seek to deny any broad notion of a group right to religious freedom and argue instead for a 
more substantively “secular” account of the public sphere premised on a narrower conception of 
individual right.  This still entangles the State in concerns of “religion,” but now only in relation 
to a significantly narrower conception of individual “conscience,” “belief,” and (private) 
“practice.”  This normative conception both requires a redefinition of what constitutes religion 
and a proper religious subjectivity38 and at the same time empowers the State to intervene more 
aggressively for regulatory purposes in any communal, traditional, customary, or religious 
spheres of life currently under non-state forms of authority.  Indeed, the very purpose and 
rationality of such regulation is to “liberate” individuals from oppression or backwardness of 
traditional forms of authority.  On this view it would be preferable for Muslim personal law 
ultimately to wither way as an anachronism or greatly be reduced in its scope and social power 
by being replaced with a system of uniform civil law.39   
We see a mirror opposite in the camps supporting the Bill.  Like the traditional ulama 
bodies, political, liberal, and secular Muslim groups argue for a broad collective right to religious 
freedom, but not for the purposes of non-interference.  What they seek is public recognition.  The 
public sphere should be open to and engage with different collective religious identities and 
norms, but should be subject to the overriding secular discipline and normative constraints of the 
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Constitution itself.  From an opposite vantage point, moderate ulama and “progressive” Muslim 
civil society groups argue similarly for public recognition, engagement, and access to justice, but 
subject to the normative demand of reasonable accommodation by the State of Islamic norms and 
practices.  
What makes consideration of these issues so difficult and divisive is that these four 
positions are often run seamlessly together, confused by proponents and opponents alike, or are 
considered in isolation from each other.  We can see, for example, how supporters of the 
recognition of Muslim personal law, especially those within Muslim communities, are concerned 
not only with the right to freedom of religion or belief, but also with issues of women’s rights and 
gender equality (especially as these rights have historically been violated by state action.)  
Polemical portrayals of the patriarchal nature of Islam and of aggressive Islamist politics in the 
public sphere and the framing by Muslim leaders of their claims in the name of religion and 
religious freedom only combine to obscure this more subtle dialectic.  Conversely we can see 
how the arguments of secular opponents of recognition implicate not only on issues of gender 
equality, but also the scope and meaning of the right to religious freedom.  Critical judgments 
made by law reformers and rights activists regarding the justice of Islamic norms on the grounds 
of divergence from assumptions internal to liberal theory obscure the degree to which these 
claims rest on contingent and contested accounts of the right to freedom of religion or belief 
itself.  
In this type of situation then, where a minority asserts claims of right against the majority 
while at the same time asserting the legitimacy of certain internal communal restrictions, we face 
a far more complex and multifaceted dialectic than is often supposed.  Such situations compel us 
to take seriously the plurality of whole ways of life complete with their associated conflicting 
moralities and often exclusionary allegiances. This, in turn, requires us to confront conceptions of 
the good that resist legal privatization and relegation to the private sphere of voluntary 
association which is their fate under the neutrality of the liberal state.  The type of modus vivendi 
pluralism we see emerging in South African seeks a priori not to suppress or deny these types of 
demands, but rather to create a diversity of jurisdictions or normative domains for the various 
contending communities to reach (provisional) settlements.  
  This is a distinctly “mixed” conception of political order, with all the conflicts of 
jurisdiction that such plural inheritances give rise to in the laws of marriage and the family, and 
in this way it complicates the neat public/private divide imagined in liberal theory.  It further 
illustrates how the right to freedom of religion is not a singular notion, but rather a complicated 
bundle of entitlements, each made up of a diversity of claims, and thus protects a range of human 
interests that are often at odds. When conflicts arise, as they inevitably do, these can reasonably 
be settled in different ways, making a general or universal theory impossible.   
 
Legislative Recognition versus Judicial Adjudication 
There are three further important implications that follow from this conception of the relationship 
between religious establishment and religious freedom.  The first is the important practical 
difference between recognition via legislative reform as opposed to via judicial process and 
adjudication.  While both involve a conception of religious establishment in terms of religious 
freedom, the mode and practical terms of engagement are quite different.  The reform process 
seeking legislation recognizing Muslim marriages is clearly not a concordat or formal legal 
agreement between the State and a religious community.40  It does, however, contain some 
similarities.  Since 1996 the SALRC has engaged in a far-reaching and ongoing process of 
outreach, requests for submissions, hearings, and negotiation on reform proposals with South 
Africa’s Muslim communities and ulama organizations.  This has required the State to engage 
directly with affected communities and thus with the conflicts and divergent politics that any 
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such engagement entails.  For all its contradictions and perceived weaknesses, the 2003 Bill is a 
reflection of this substantive political engagement. 
It is instructive to compare this with the religious freedom jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court during the same time period.  The Court has decided three major cases under 
Article 15 since 1996.41  Despite its rhetoric of religious pluralism, associational autonomy, and 
reasonable accommodation, and despite the explicit collective rights provisions in the Bill of 
Rights, the Court has decided each of these leading Section 15 cases in favor of restricting claims 
to religious freedom and against challenges to unfair discrimination on the basis of religion.  This 
supports the contention that the moralizing politics of religious freedom diverge in important 
respects from the messy politics of religious establishment as represented by the SALRC project 
to recognize Muslim marriages.   
The adjudication of rights claims assumes the form of a techne or technology of liberal 
governance which, paradoxically, serves to increase the power of the State by restricting or 
dismissing the claims to religious freedom and collective identity of actually existing religious 
communities.   This obscures the extent to which South African law and the public sphere remain 
entangled both directly and indirectly with Christian norms, symbols, and practices,42  and 
illustrates how a majority of the Court has been willing to interpret the right to religious freedom 
and the prohibition on unfair religious discrimination to give priority to the values of the majority 
religious culture.43 
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Shari’a as Muslim personal law in the Spaces of Modern Secular Power 
A second striking feature of the 2003 Bill is Section 15, which provides for disputes relating to 
“the interpretation or application of any provision” to be referred to a court for adjudication, but 
on the proviso that a “Muslim judge from that court” or, in the alternative, a senior “Muslim 
advocate or attorney,” is appointed to hear the dispute at first instance.44  The court is then to be 
“assisted by two Muslim assessors who shall have specialized knowledge of Islamic law.”45  Any 
decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, but the decision must also be 
submitted to two accredited Muslim institutions “for written comment on questions of law only,” 
which must be lodged within 60 days with the Registrar of the appeal court.46  
Here again we can see the various ways in which this mixed institutional arrangement 
tracks the four dynamics discussed above.  The courts may not apply a uniform civil law of 
marriage to all spheres of social life, nor may they apply (even if it were possible) shari’a to the 
exclusion of existing state law.  The courts may further not deny recognition of Muslim personal 
law as in the past, leaving the social practice and regulation of Muslim marriages to ulama 
bodies.  Rather the Bill requires the court to apply a statute that both recognizes and regulates 
aspects of Muslim personal law.  This hybrid normativity is reflected in both the procedural and 
substantive structure of the court itself, which requires Muslim judges to interpret and apply both 
Islamic law (as incorporated in the statute) and constitutional rights and values in relation to 
Islamic norms and practices.   
This dialogic and mediating conception of both law and the role of legal officials is also 
apparent in the appeal structure.  Final authority is vested in the Supreme Court of Appeal, which 
has the power to overrule legal interpretations by Muslim judges assisted by two specialist 
assessors (i.e. to overrule judgments concerning the proper relationship between different sources 
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and jurisprudential schools of both state and Islamic law).47  But before doing so, the Court must 
consider and expressly overrule the opinions of two ulama bodies.  What Robert Cover once 
termed the “jurispathic power” of the state—the state’s domination of autonomous paideic 
communities under a unitary law—must in this way justify any coercive suppression of the 
“fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle.”48  
This dialogic hybrid conception of adjudication sits uneasily between shari’a courts 
presided over by qadis engaged in ijtihad, on the one hand, and secular courts enforcing Muslim 
personal law norms as encoded into statutes, on the other.  The question is how Islamic norms are 
to be incorporated into state law and how legal officials are to interpret those norms once 
codified.  Certain Muslim legal scholars, for example, have criticized the definition of mahr in 
the Bill, which they argue departs from classical Islamic law.49  Similarly scholars have 
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questioned how Muslim judges and assessors are to choose between and apply different schools 
of Islamic jurisprudence in cases involving different claimants.50 Finally, there is the question of 
what “Islamic law” is exactly and how it is to be identified.51 
While these are complex and contested questions, they are the kinds of normative 
dilemmas that a value pluralist theory of law both anticipates and celebrates.  The logic of 
Section 15 is that the very presence of Muslim judges and assessors on state courts combined 
with the advisory role of ulama bodies has the potential to create dynamic opportunities for 
interpretation and development of the law in dialogue between the courts and South Africa’s 
Muslim communities.  This is hoped to avoid the otherwise ossifying effects of shari’a being 
codified into state law in the form of Muslim personal law.52  Regardless of these jurisprudential 
debates, this clearly represents a different normative conception of freedom, religion, community, 
and the individual to that imagined in classical liberal theory with its rigid insistence on state 
neutrality mediated by a scheme of individual rights. 
Finally, the Bill reflects the extent to which shari’a today has taken on distinctly liberal 
characteristics and sensibilities under the secular framework of the South African constitution. As 
Saba Mahmood has suggested in the Egyptian context, shari’a has been fundamentally 
transformed and now inhabits the spaces of personal status or religion-based family law under the 
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regulatory discipline of the state, which grants religious groups certain juridical autonomy over 
family affairs.  
 As we have seen, this dynamic is reflected in the fourth position responding to the Bill as the 
traditional ulama bodies have resisted the proposed legislation on the grounds that Muslim 
personal law comprises the core of Islamic tradition and identity.  Again Section 15 seeks to 
respond to these concerns by ensuring that both Muslim judges and ulama bodies are integrally 
involved and consulted in any judicial changes to Muslim personal law.  Section 13 further 
requires compulsory mediation between the parties before an accredited Mediation Council prior 
to adjudication. For the ulama this provision was seen as an important medium through which to 
manage and resolve disputes regarding marriages and divorce outside of State courts and law.   
The latest version of the Bill reflects the continuing anxiety and political tensions between 
the four camps over these issues.  Reflecting the concerns of its secular opponents, the 2010 Bill 
now no longer contains Section 15 requiring a Muslim judge or the need for Muslim assessors, 
and the requirement of binding mediation has been replaced with a proposal for voluntary 
mediation.  Reflecting the concerns of its ulama opponents, however, the Bill now contains an 
explicit definition of the sources of Islamic law which is likely to limit the discretion of judges in 
interpreting and changing Muslim personal law norms.53   
 
Family Law and Muslim Personal Law 
A final striking aspect of the politics surrounding the Bill has been the question of the 
relationship between “family law” and “Muslim personal law.”  Criticisms of the Bill by gender 
equality advocates have often been premised on the assumption that recognition of Muslim 
personal law is antithetical to the guarantee of gender equality in family law.  For example we 
have seen how the Bill codifies the default position regarding the proprietary consequences of 
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marriage in Islamic law by providing that, unless an ante-nuptial contract is entered into by the 
spouses and registered, a “Muslim marriage to which this Act applies shall be deemed to be a 
marriage out of community of property, excluding the accrual system.”54  This differs from the 
civil law position where the default rule is “in community of property.”55  The Bill further 
specifies that in registering a Muslim marriage the marriage officer must record “the dower 
agreed to.”56  The term “dower” or “mahr” is then defined as “the money, property or anything of 
value, including benefits which must be payable by the husband to the wife as an ex lege 
consequence of the marriage itself in order to establish a family and lay the foundations for 
affection and companionship.”57  These provisions have attracted criticism for codifying 
discriminatory differences between men and women: the husband only is required to pay the 
mahr and to maintain his wife both during and after the marriage; upon the dissolution of 
marriage, the wife has property rights only out of community of property (without accrual), and 
her right to maintenance is only for the period of iddah (three months).  Such differences are 
argued to violate the right to equality, and gender rights advocates have thus viewed this form of 
legal recognition of Muslim personal law a priori as a threat to women’s rights. 
While space precludes detailed consideration of these questions, there are a number of 
reasons why such critiques rest on often problematic assumptions that serve to exacerbate rather 
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than address the otherwise genuine concerns they raise.  The first is what may be termed the 
“incomplete secularization of family law” thesis.  As Mahmood has suggested in the context of 
postcolonial states in the Middle East, the “continuing persistence of religion-based family laws 
… is often seen as a sign of the incomplete secularization of these societies and the failure of the 
postcolonial state to draw a firewall separation between religion and the state.”58  Viewed as an 
outdated and pre-modern remnant, such religion-based family laws “are understood to exhibit an 
ossified and recalcitrant quality that should have been remedied by the secularizing force of civil 
law.”59  But as many scholars have shown, this account fails to appreciate how “the telescoping 
of religious law into the domain of the family is not so much a violation of secular principles as it 
is the product of the simultaneous relegation of religion, family, and sexuality to the private 
sphere under the regime of modern governance.”60  The result of this privatization under the 
modern power of political secularism is that 
[f]amily law as a distinct legal domain is a modern invention that did not exist in its 
present form in the premodern period.  Classical sharia jurisprudence did not, for 
example, entail a separate domain called ‘family law’ …. [and] what is now associated 
with the core and essence of religion (Christian and Muslim alike), that is, personal 
status or family law, is an amalgam constructed from a variety of customary and 
religious jurisdictions that came to acquire an autonomous and distinct character in the 
modern period.61 
Once this historical genealogy is recognized, the notion that complete secularization of religion-
based systems of family law will lead to increased gender equality becomes inherently 
problematic.  Indeed, as the family has become “a key site of intervention for projects of social 
reform undertaken by the state” in the modern period, this has in many cases served to increase 
                                                 
58. Mahmood,  57.  
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid., 58. 
61. Ibid. 
gender inequality, especially in relation to the institution of marriage.62 
Viewing family law and the institution of marriage as sites of inequality and 
exceptionalism63 can help us to see the extent to which the existing system of family law in South 
Africa is deeply entangled with Protestant genealogies and understandings of the family.64  The 
extent to which marriage as an institution remains an established status that is implicated in the 
functions of both social order and personal freedom generating its own inherent inequalities will 
further be apparent.65  Following Janet Halley this would suggest that we should pay more careful 
attention to the marriage system as a whole—including its various “drop-off” and “form-
pluralism” elements—and the complex ways in which it paradoxically intertwines both status and 
contract.66  This would allow us critically to examine the multifaceted, exclusionary, and unequal 
effects of the South African marriage system which now includes civil, common law, customary, 
same-sex, domestic partnership, Muslim, and (currently under consideration) Hindu marriages.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has argued that the law reform effort to recognize Muslim marriages and Muslim 
personal law more broadly in South Africa allows us to locate these dilemmas within the 
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problematic space of modern secular power and the various anxieties and contingencies this gives 
rise to regarding the limits of liberal neutrality and liberal rights.  In this respect South Africa’s 
response to the claims of its Muslim communities sheds light on the two main dilemmas haunting 
modern liberal accounts of the right to religious freedom.  The first concerns the neutrality of the 
public sphere and the insistence that religion is properly a matter for private life, where religious 
faith, identity, and ritual are to be simultaneously contained and protected and excluded from 
public life where rational secular discourse is similarly to be construed and secured.  The second 
concerns the universality of the right to religious freedom and its justification in liberal political 
morality in terms of competing accounts of autonomy.   
The South African case has been shown to complicate these narratives.  It allows us to see 
that the neutrality of the political order is always an abstract particularism comprising contingent 
settlements and negotiated religion-state establishments.  It further allows us to see how the 
existing contours of the public sphere reflect the “private faith” of communities which have 
historically embodied the Christian and European traditions of South Africa’s colonial past.  If 
correct, the challenge is not further to exclude the claims of religious communities, but to ensure 
that the public sphere reflects and recognizes the diversity of South Africa’s actually existing 
religious communities. 
The South African case also allows us to see that the universality of the right to religious 
freedom is always a concrete universal claiming normative authority.  A value pluralist, group-
differentiated account of freedom of religion or belief requires the state to recognize a limited 
sphere of collective autonomy or nomian separation—a space for “associational self-realization 
in nomian terms.”  Such a Coverian view of normative and legal pluralism challenges the state’s 
domination of autonomous communities under a unitary law and seeks for the polynomia of legal 
meaning to be extended to the domain of social practice and control.  Thus rather than 
circumscribing the nomos in a single, statist “Spartan eunomia,” it invites in new worlds in the 
form of a complex nomos of “equally dignified communal bases of legal meaning that constitute 
the array of commitments, realities, and visions extant at any given time.”67  The old adage of 
“one law for all and no exceptions” on this view gives way to “plural laws for different 
communities with certain exceptions.” 
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